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Abstract
We have investigated the security game under non-additive
utility functions.
Introduction
The nature of resource allocation in practical security games
often results in exponentially many pure strategies for the
defender, such that the defender’s optimal mixed strategy is
hard to solve. In the past few years, several works have tried
to resolve this issue from both theoretical and practical per-
spectives (Kiekintveld et al. 2009; Korzhyk, Conitzer, and
Parr 2010; Jain et al. 2011; Letchford and Conitzer 2013;
Xu et al. 2014; Xu 2016). A common restriction in these
works is to assume that the attacker only attacks one tar-
get or that different targets are independent. The latter im-
plies that the payoff of a group of targets is the sum of the
payoffs of each one (Korzhyk, Conitzer, and Parr 2011).
In practice, there exists various linkage structures among
the targets such that attacking one target will influence the
others. Traditional models that ignore the inherent synergy
effect between the targets could lead to catastrophic con-
sequences (Buldyrev et al. 2010). Motivated by this phe-
nomenon, there are some recent works that investigate the
security game with dependent targets (Shakarian, Lei, and
Lindelauf 2014; Vorobeychik and Letchford 2015).
However, these works are limited to specific dependencies
and do not provide a systematic understanding of complex-
ity properties or provide an efficient algorithm. For exam-
ple, Shakarian et al. (2014) assumes that the attacker and
defender can choose a subset of all nodes in a power gird
and their utilities are dependent on the set of disconnected
loads. They show that the defender best response problem
(DBR) can be solved in polynomial time if the attacker at-
tacks at most one target, while NP-hard in other cases. How-
ever, their complexity results cannot be easily reduced to the
complexity of determining defender’s mixed strategies.
In this paper, we introduce a new security game, we call
the Non-additivity Security Game (NASG), which is a non-
zero-sum game including two players - the defender and at-
tacker, and n targets, denoted by [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n}. We
Copyright c© 2017, Association for the Advancement of Artificial
Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.
model various dependencies of targets by defining the strat-
egy of each player as a subset of [n] and adopt a general set
function as the utilities. Specifically, the attacker will obtain
benefits for successfully attacked targets and pay a cost for
its strategy. Also, the defender will lose benefits for those
targets and also pays a cost. A critical point in the NASG is
that the benefit and cost for several targets is not the sum-
mation of each target’s utility, instead, it is dependent on the
specific combination of targets..
At a high level, the main challenge of NASG is that both
the size of the strategy space and the number of utility func-
tions are Θ(2n). We wonder how the following questions
that are well understood in the case of additive utility func-
tions can be addressed in the case of non-additivity assump-
tion.
• How to compactly represent the NASG and how to effi-
ciently compute the mixed strategies of NASG?
• What is the complexity of computing the mixed strategies
of NASG?
To answer these questions, we make the following contri-
butions: (1) We provide the condition for compactly repre-
senting NASG and prove that there exists poly(n) number of
variables in the compact model if the number of non-additive
utility functions is poly(n). The main technique is isomor-
phism and projection of a polytope. (2) We design an algo-
rithmic framework to efficiently compute the mixed strate-
gies for NASGs by reducing the original problem to an ora-
cle problem. The main technique is to design a polynomial-
time vertex mapping algorithm from the low-dimensional
polytope to a simplex; (3) We prove that above oracle prob-
lem and the computation of mixed strategies of NASG can
be reduced to each other in polynomial-time under a reason-
able restriction. Furthermore, we show that such an oracle
problem is a problem of maximizing a pseudo-boolean func-
tion; (4) Finally, we apply our theoretical framework to the
network security game. We provide polynomial-time algo-
rithms for some kinds of networks and security measures,
while for the general case, we show the NP-hardness and
propose an approximation algorithm.
All the proofs in this paper are left to the supplemental
material due to the space limitation.
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Problem Description and Preliminary
We begin by defining the NASG as a two-player normal-
form non-zero-sum game.
Players and targets: The NASG contains two players (a
defender and an attacker), and n targets, indexed by set
[n] , {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Strategies and utility functions: A pure strategy for each
player is a subset of [n]. In the general case, we consider
the complete pure strategy space of attacker and defender,
defined as the power set 2[n] , {V |V ⊆ [n]}, denoted by A
and D, respectively. So there are N , 2n pure strategies for
both players. Let set function Ca(·) : A → R and Cd(·) :
D → R be the attacker’s and defender’s cost function, and
the set function B(·) : A → R be the benefit function.
Remark 1. Traditional models do not consider a cost func-
tion, instead, they assume there exists a resource constraint
such that certain strategies, i.e., subsets of [n], are restricted.
In our paper, we explicitly consider the cost function but do
not have such resource constraints1. In cybersecurity ap-
plications, security resources are available for a cost and
can be used to replace resource constraints, as illustrated
in (Vorobeychik and Letchford 2015).
Tie-breaking Rule: When the attacker and defender
choose strategy A ∈ A and D ∈ D, targets in the set
A\D are successfully attacked by the attacker. Moreover,
both players should pay the cost for their strategy, and the
attacker’s and defender’s payoff is given by [B(A\D) −
Ca(A)] and [−B(A\D)− Cd(D)], respectively.
Normal-form representation: Suppose that the order of
the attacker’s pure strategy is given by index function σ(·) :
A → {1, 2, · · · , N}, then define the index function µ(·) for
defender’s pure strategy2: µ(U) = σ(U c) for any U ∈ D.
Then we can define the utility matrices including the cost
matrices of attacker and defender: CA,CD ∈ RN×N ,
CAσ(A),µ(D) = Ca(A),C
D
σ(A),µ(D) = Cd(D),∀A,D ∈ 2[n],
and the benefit matrix M ∈ RN×N ,
Mσ(A),µ(D) = B(A\D),∀A,D ∈ 2[n].
LetMa andMd be the attacker’s and defender’s payoff ma-
trices. It’s clear thatMa = M−CA andMd = −M−CD.
The mixed strategy p,q ∈ ∆N is a distribution over the set
of pure strategyA,D, where pσ(A),qµ(D) is the probability
that attacker choose strategy A and defender choose strat-
egy D. ∆N represents a N -dimensional simplex. Then the
expected payoffs for the attacker and defender is given by
following bilinear form, when they play the mixed strategy
p ∈ ∆N and q ∈ ∆N , by
Ua(p,q) = p
TMaq and Ud(p,q) = pTMdq.
Solution Concepts: In this paper, we assume that both
players move simultaneously and the standard solution con-
cept is the Nash Equilibrium (NE). Our goal is to compute
1Later, in this paper, we will consider the limited resource.
2This definition of the index function is to guarantee the sym-
metry of benefit matrix, which simplifies most theoretical results.
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computation of mixed strategies of NASG can be reduced to
each other in polynomial-time under a reasonable assump-
tion. Besides, such oracle problem is shown to be a prob-
lem of maximizing a pseudo-boolean function; (4) Finally,
we apply our theoretical framework to the network security
game and consider various cases. We provide polynomial-
time algorithm for some kinds of networks and security mea-
sures, while for the general case, we show the NP-hardness
and propose a novel approximation algorithm.
All the proofs in this paper are left to the supplement ma-
terial due to the space limitation.
Problem Description and Preliminary
We begin by defining the NASG as a two-player normal-
form non-zero-sum game.
Players and targets: The NASG contains two players (a
defender and an attacker), and n targets, indexed by set
[n] , {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Strategies and utility functions:A pure strategy for each
player is a subset of [n]. In the general case, we consider
the complete pure strategy space1 of attacker and defender,
defined as the power set 2[n] = {V |V ✓ [n]}, denoted by A
and D, respectively. So there are N = 2n pure strategies for
both players. Let set function Ca(·) : A ! R and Cd(·) :
D ! R be the attacker’s and defender’s cost function, and
the set function B(·) : A! R be the benefit function.
Remark 1. Some security game models assu e that the de-
fense polices are costless but resource bounded, in which the
defender has k resources with which to cover targets. Moti-
vated by the domain in cybersecurity, military attack and
defense, security resources are only available at some cost
and cost on resources may usefully replace resource con-
straints (Vorobeychik and Letchford 2015).
The mixed strategy p,q 2 RN is a distribution over the
set of pure strategy A,D. The set of all the mixed strat-
egy of attacker and defender are same and denoted as N -
dimensional simplex  N .
Tie-breaking Rule: When the attacker and defender
choose strategy A 2 A and D 2 D, targets in the set
A\D are successfully attacked by the attacker. Moreover,
both players should pay the cost for their strategy, and the
attacker’s and defender’s payoff is given by [B(A\D)  
Ca(A)] and [ B(A\D)  Cd(D)], respectively.
Normal-form representation: Suppose that the order of
the at acker’s pure strategy is given by index function  (·) :
A ! {1, 2, · · · , N}, define the index function µ(·) for de-
fender’s pure strategy2: µ(U) =  (U c) for any U 2 D.
Then we can define the utility matrices including the cost
ma rices of attacker and defender, CA,CD 2 RN⇥N ,
CA (A),µ(D) = Ca(A),C
D
 (A),µ(D) = Cd(D), 8A,D 2 2[n],
and the benefit matrixM 2 RN⇥N ,
M (A),µ(D) = B(A\D), 8A,D 2 2[n].
1Here we do not consider the resource constraint. In the later
section, we will further study the case with limited resource.
2This definition of the index function is to guarantee the sym-
metry of benefit matrix, which simplifies most theoretical results.
Figure 1: The summary of main results. The double arrow
denotes the polynomial time reduction.
LetMa andMd be the attacker’s and defender’s payoff ma-
trices. It’s clear thatMa =M CA andMd =  M CD.
The expected payoffs for the attacker and defender is given
by following bilinear form, when they play the mixed strat-
egy p 2  N and q 2  N , by
Ua(p,q) = p
TMaq and Ud(p,q) = pTMdq.
Solution Concepts: In this paper, we assume that both
players move simultaneously and the standard solution con-
cept is the Nash equilibrium (NE). This assumption is pretty
common for describing the interactions with terrorism, since
the defender’s actions are confidential in some cases (Ma-
j r 2002). Our goal is to compute the defender’s minimax
mixed strategies and we call it as the min max problem.
The following three definitions have been heavily used in
our theoretical development.
Definition 1. The common utility is defined as the transform
of the b nefit function B(·) for all U 2 2[n],
Bc(U) =
X
V✓U
( 1)|U\V |B(V ).
Similar definitions hold for cost function: Ca(·), Cd(·)
and their common utility: Cca(·), Ccd(·), and the details can
be seen in supplemental material.
Definition 2. The support set of NASG is
S = {U 2 A|Bc(U) or Cca(U) or Ccd(U) 6= 0}, (1)
and index support set  (S) = { (U)|U 2 S}.
Definition 3. The projection operator ⇡S : RN ! R|S| is
⇡S((x1,x2, . . . ,xN )) = (. . . ,x (U), . . .), 8U 2 S, (2)
and projection of polytope: ⇧S( N ) , {⇡S(x)|x 2  N}.
Strategically Zero-sum form
Although the NASG contains non-zero-sum payoff, the fol-
lowing proposition shows that it indeed belongs to the strate-
gically zero-sum game (Moulin and Vial 1978).
Proposition 1. The set of Nash equilibriums of NASG is
equivalent to the set of Nash equilibriums of zero-sum game
with payoff matricesM CA +CD.
Clearly, the stackelberg equilibrium set is equivalent to
the NE set of NASG. This proposition allows us to solve
the NASG via the equivalent zero-sum game, which can be
tackled by the linear programming approach. In the sequel,
we useM  =M CA +CD to denote the payoff matrix.
Theorem 2
Figure 1: The summary of main results. The double arrow
denotes the polynomial time reduction. The single arrow de-
notes the co pact representation
the defender’s minimax mixed strategies and we call it the
min max problem.
The following three definitions are heavily used in our
theoretical development.
Definition 1. The common utility is defined as the transform
of the benefit function B(·) for all U ∈ 2[n],
Bc(U) =
∑
V⊆U
(−1)|U\V |B(V ).
Similar definitions hold for cost functions: Ca(·), Cd(·)
and their common utility: Cca(·), Ccd(·), and the details can
be seen in the supplemental material.
Definition 2. The support set of NASG is
S = {U ∈ A|Bc(U) or Cca(U) or Ccd(U c) 6= 0}, (1)
and support index s t σ(S) = {σ(U)|U ∈ S}.
Definition 3. The projection operator piS : RN → R|S| is
piS((x1,x2, . . . ,xN )) = (. . . ,xi, . . .)i∈σ(S), (2)
and projection of polytope: ΠS(∆N ) , {piS(x)|x ∈ ∆N}.
Strategically Zero-sum Form
Although a NASG contains non-zero-sum payoff, we prove
the following proposition, which shows that it belongs to the
strategically zero-sum game (Moulin and Vial 1978).
Proposition 1. The set of Nash equilibriums of NASG is
equivalent to the set of Nash equilibriums of zero-sum game
with payoff matrix M−CA +CD.
Clearly, the stackelberg equilibrium set is equivalent to
the NE set of the NASG. This proposition allows us to solve
the NASG via the equivalent zero-sum game, which can be
tackled by a linear programming approach. In the sequel, we
use M◦ = M−CA +CD to denote the payoff matrix.
Remark 2. Traditional zero-sum security game (Xu 2016)
assumes that the defender gets a reward ri if target i is cov-
ered, or incurs a cost ci if uncovered. We can set specific
values for our utility functions to recover their setting.
The main results of this paper is summarized in Fig. 1.
The Compact Representation of NASG
Based on the equivalent zero-sum game M◦ and von Neu-
mann’s minimax theorem, computing the NE of NASG can
be formulated as the following min max problem,
min
q∈∆N
max
p∈∆N
pTM◦q. (3)
This optimization model has 2n+1 variables, which implies
that NASG is in general hard to solve. The goal of this sec-
tion is to find a condition on the NASG that can be com-
pactly represented with only poly(n) variables. To convey
our idea more easily, we begin with an example.
Motivating Example
We first conduct the gauss elimination of the matrix M◦ to
transform it into the row canonical form, which is to left and
right multiply M◦ by elementary matrices E and F,
min
q∈∆N
max
p∈∆N
pTM◦q = min
q∈∆N
max
p∈∆N
pTE−1EM◦FF−1q
= min
q∈∆N
max
p∈∆N
pTE−1
[
M◦r 0
0 0
]
F−1q.
where r is the rank of payoff matrix M◦ and M◦r is the
non-zero block of its row canonical form. If we define the
affine projection f(p) =
(
pTE−1
)T
, g(q) = F−1q, and
let ∆aN = {f(p)|p ∈ ∆N}, ∆dN = {g(q)|q ∈ ∆N}, we
can obtain the following optimization problem,
min
q′∈∆dN
max
p′∈∆aN
p′T
[
M◦r 0
0 0
]
q′. (4)
Since the polyhedra ∆aN and ∆N are isomorphic, their
vertices exhibit the one-one correspondence. Similar argu-
ment for the polyhedra ∆dN and ∆N . Thus the optimization
problem (3) and (4) is equivalent. Further, considering the
fact that only the first r elements in vector p′ and q′ have
the non-zero coefficients in (4), we can further simplify it as
min
q′∈Πr(∆dN)
max
p′∈Πr(∆aN)
p′TM◦rq
′, (5)
where the operator Πr(·) is to project the N−dimensional
polytope into its first r−coordinates.
Remark 3. The observation is that the number of variables
in the model (5) depends on the rank of payoff matrix. For
example, if the rank of M◦ is poly(n), we can compactly
represent NASG with only poly(n) variables.
The Formal Description of Compact NASG
Although the above conceptual derivation provides a pos-
sible path to compactly represent the NASG, there exists a
significant technical challenge: the elementary matrices E,
F and their inverse matrices have exponential size, can we
find both elementary matrices efficiently? To tackle this
problem, we first show that the payoff matrix M◦ can be
decomposed as the product of three matrices. The following
technical lemma is critical in our decomposition.
Lemma 1. For all U ∈ 2[n], benefit function satisfies
B(U) =
∑
V⊆U
Bc(V ).
Note that similar results hold for the cost functions and
their common utility. Then we have the decomposition of
payoff matrix M◦ in terms of common utilities and an illus-
trative example can be seen in the supplemental material.
The Framework of Compact Representation
Isomorphic polytope: solving the NASG is equivalent to
solving the following optimization problem,
min
q′∈∆dN
max
p′∈∆aN
p′T (D− L+V)q′ (7)
Projection of polytope: projects the polytope ∆aN and
∆dN into coordinates with indices in σ(S), and further
simplify (7) as the following compact represented model,
Compact NASG min
q′∈ΠS(∆dN)
max
p′∈ΠS(∆aN)
p′TMSq′ (8)
where matrix MS is a sub-matrix of D− L + V, which
is obtained by extracting those rows and columns whose
index belonging to σ(S).
Figure 2: The isomorphism and projection of a polytope
Theorem 1. The payoff matrix M◦ = M−CA +CD can
be decomposed as
M◦ = Q(D− L+V)QT , (6)
where D is the diagonal matrix with Dσ(A),σ(A) = Bc(A).
V and L are two sparse matrices with non-zero elements:
Vµ([n]),σ(A) = C
c
d(A),Lµ(D),σ({∅}) = C
c
a(D
c). The Q is
binary matrix with Qσ(A),µ(D) = 1{Dc ⊆ A}.
Based on this result, we can let elementary matrices E =
Q−1, F = (QT )−1, affine transformation f(p) = QTp
and g(q) = QTq to yield two isomorphic polytopes: ∆aN
and ∆dN with ∆N . The whole procedure is listed in Fig. 2,
and the following theorem answers part of our first question.
Theorem 2. If |S| = poly(n), the rank of the pay-
off matrix M◦ is poly(n), moreover, the NASG can be
compactly represented by poly(n) number of variables
and (p∗,q∗) is a NE of NASG if and only if (piS(f(p∗)),
piS(g(q
∗))) is the optimal solution of (8).
Since we do not utilize the row canonical form of M◦,
instead, we extract the non-zero columns and rows of D −
L + V to form the low-dimensional matrix MS , the Theo-
rem 2 provides only a sufficient condition for our compact
representation. Indeed, we can make it both sufficient and
necessary by further conducting elementary elimination to
transform the matrix D − L + V into an approximate di-
agonal matrix D. However, this process will significantly
complicate our affine transformation f and g, and make it
impossible to map the optimal solution of compact model
(8) to the original mixed strategy.
Implication of compact NASG: From the perspective
of attacker’s utility function, our compact representation (8)
simplifies Ua(p,q) as (similar result holds for Ud(p,q)),∑
U∈S
p′σ(U)[q
′
σ(U)B
c(U)− Cca(U)]. (9)
Based on the definition of affine transformation f, g and ma-
trix Q, each variable p′σ(U) =
∑
V :U⊆V pσ(V ) is the prob-
ability that the attacker attacks all the targets in set U , while
q′σ(U) =
∑
V⊆Uc qµ(V ) is the probability that defender does
not defend any any targets in set U . Therefore, we can re-
gard Bc(U), Cca(U) (not B(U) and Ca(U)!) as the benefit
and cost function for a “virtual target U”, and the formula
(9) calculates the expected utility in such a new game.
Remark 4. If all the utility functions are additive, then all
the common utility functions are zero except those defined
on the singleton set. Thus S = [n] ∪ {∅} and each variable
p′σ({i}), q
′
σ({i}) in the compact model is a marginal proba-
bility that target i is attacked or defended, thus our frame-
work recovers the results in (Kiekintveld et al. 2009).
In the sequel, the terminology NASG refers to those
NASGs those only have poly(n) variables in their compact
model. Based on our compact representation, a natural ques-
tion arising is that, can we efficiently solve such compact
model and implement the optimal solution by the defender’s
mixed strategy? We will answer this question in the next sec-
tion.
Oracle-based Algorithmic Framework
The main result of this section is given in the following the-
orem.
Theorem 3. There is a poly(n) time algorithm to solve the
min max problem, if there is a poly(n) time algorithm to
compute the defender oracle problem, defined as, for any
vector w ∈ R|S|, compute
x∗ = arg max
x∈ΠS(∆dN )
wTx. (10)
It is not surprising that the compact NASG can be re-
duced to the defender oracle problem (DOP), and the re-
duction follows from an application of equivalence between
separation and optimization (Gro¨tschel, Lova´sz, and Schri-
jver 1981). What is interesting, however, is the reduction
from the min max problem to the compact NASG. Namely,
how to map the optimal solution of compact NASG to a de-
fender’s mixed strategy in poly(n) time. We show that this
could be done by exploiting the geometric structure of poly-
tope ∆dN .
Reducing Compact NASG to Oracle Problem
For simplicity, we use Ha and Hd to denote the polytope
ΠS(∆
a
N ) and ΠS(∆
d
N ), and Ia and Id to denote their ver-
tices, respectively. The compactly represented NASG (8)
can be formulated as the linear programing (LP) problem.
Compact-LP min u (11)
s.t. vTMSq′ ≤ u ∀v ∈ Ia,
q′ ∈ Hd. (12)
The compact LP has poly(n) number of variables and
possibly exponentially many constraints. One can therefore
apply the ellipsoid method to solve such an LP, given a
poly(n) time separation oracle. Further, the separation or-
acle can be reduced to the following two parts: given any
(q′, u), (1) membership problem: decide whether q′ ∈ Hd.
If not, generate a hyperplane that separating (q′, u) and Hd;
(2) inequality constraint problem: decide whether all the
inequality constraints hold. If not, find one violating con-
straint. We have the following result for these problems.
Algorithm 1 Vertex Mapping from Vertex to Pure Strategy
Input: Vertex vU ∈ Id
Output: Defender’s pure strategy U of original NASG
T = ∅;
for each i ∈ [n] do
if vUσ({i}) 6= 0 then T = T ∪ {i};
end for
U = T c;
Lemma 2. The membership problem and inequality con-
straint problem of compact LP (11) can be reduced to the
defender oracle problem (10) in poly(n) time.
Reducing NASG to Compact NASG
A classical result in combinatorial optimization is that if
the separation problem of polytope P ∈ Rn can be solved
in poly(n) time, we can decompose any point x ∈ P
into the convex combination of at most (n + 1) vertices of
P (Gro¨tschel, Lova´sz, and Schrijver 1981). Note that this is
precisely the DOP required for above reduction. Applying
this result to the optimal solution x∗ of compact LP (11),
we can get a convex decomposition that x∗ =
∑|S|+1
i=1 λiv
i,
where vi ∈ Id. If we can map the vertices vi back to the
vertices (pure strategy) of original NASG, denoted by h(vi),
the mixed strategies of defender can be expressed as
q∗ =
|S|+1∑
i=1
λih(v
i). (13)
Thus, the key lies in how to compute h(vi) in poly(n) time.
To tackle this problem, first, considering an arbitrary pure
strategy U ∈ 2[n], the corresponding vertex is a unit vector
eU ∈ RN with only one non-zero element eUµ(U) = 1. Based
on the affine transformation g(q) = QTq, the correspond-
ing vertex of isomorphic polytope ∆dN is
g(eU ) = QTeU = QTµ(U), (14)
where Qµ(U) is the µ(U)th row of matrix Q. Then the cor-
responding point vU of the projected polytope Hd is
vU = piS(Q
T
µ(U)), (15)
which is a sub-vector of QTµ(U). The problem is that the ver-
tex in the high-dimensional polytope may not project to a
vertex of its low-dimensional image. However, the follow-
ing lemma will provide a positive result.
Lemma 3. ∀S ⊆ 2[n] s.t. [n] ⊆ S, the vertices of the poly-
tope Hd are the rows of a sub-matrix of Q, which is formed
by extracting the column whose index belongs to σ(S).
No matter which coordinate we project the polytope ∆dN
into, the number of vertices is still N , and they forms a sub-
matrix of Q. Therefore, we can exploit the property of ma-
trix Q to construct a vertex mapping algorithm and the cor-
rectness of Algorithm 1 is justified by following theorem.
Theorem 4. Vertex mapping algorithm runs in O(n) time
and maps each vertex of Hd to a unique pure strategy.
Solving NASG is a Combinatorial Problem
In this section, we will answer our second question, i.e.,
what is the complexity of the NASG, in a restrictive class:
the attacker attacks at most c targets, the defender can pro-
tect at most k targets, where c is a constant and k is arbi-
trary; the defender’s cost functions Cd(·) are additive. Then,
the attacker’s and defender’s pure strategy spaces are given
by A = {A ∈ 2[n]||A| ≤ c},D = {D ∈ 2[n]||D| ≤ k}.
Definition 4. A D-NASG is given by the tuple (A,D,B, Ca,
Cd), where the set of benefit function B = {B(A)|A ∈
A}, set of attacker’s and defender’s cost function Ca =
{Ca(A)|A ∈ A}, Cd = {Cd(i)|i ∈ [n]}.
This assumption is motivated by the fact that both play-
ers have limited resources (Kiekintveld et al. 2009) and they
cannot cover any targets. Let Na = |A| and Nd = |D| and
our main result is the following theorem.
Theorem 5. There is a poly(n) time algorithm to compute
the defender’s mixed strategy in D-NASG, if and only if
there is a poly(n) time algorithm to compute the defender
oracle problem: for any w ∈ RNa ,
x∗ = arg max
x∈H′d
wTx, (16)
where the definition of H ′d is given in (18).
Reduction between D-NASG and Oracle Problem
The reduction from D-NASG to DOP still follows our iso-
morphism and projection framework, and the main technical
step is a partial decomposition of the payoff matrix. The re-
verse direction follows from a different path. First, let the
payoff matrix of D-NASG be denoted by Mb ∈ R|A|×|D|,
which is a sub-matrix of M◦.
Theorem 6. The payoff matrix Mb ∈ RNa×Nd can be de-
composed as
Mb = IMAJT , (17)
where the matrix I ∈ RNa×Na and J ∈ RNd×Na are binary
matrices, and the matrix MA ∈ RNa×Na contains one non-
zero diagonal, non-zero row and non-zero column.
The detailed definition of each elements in matrix I,J and
MA can be seen in the supplemental material. Similarly, we
have the affine transformation: f ′(p) = ITp, g′(q) = JTq;
transformed polytope: ∆aNa , ∆
d
Nd
; projected polytope:
H ′a = ΠS(∆
a
Na), H
′
d = ΠS(∆
d
Nd
). (18)
Remark that in this case, the polytope ∆dNd is not isomorphic
with ∆Nd , but the correctness of our compact representation
follows a similar proof of Theorem 2. Further, the compactly
represented linear programming is expressed as
Compact-D-LP min u (19)
s.t. vTMAq′ ≤ u ∀v ∈ I ′a,
q′ ∈ H ′d, (20)
where I ′a is the set of vertices of polytope H
′
a.
Lemma 4. Separation problem for H ′d and compact opti-
mization problem (19) reduces to each other in poly(n) time.
Considering the equivalence between the separation (H ′d)
and optimization (DOP), we arrive at the reduction between
DOP (16) and compact model (19). The main technique in
the reduction between D-NASG and compact optimization
(19) is: (i) for any arbitrary instance MA of compact opti-
mization problem, we can construct the set of utility func-
tions: B, Ca in O(2cn) = O(n) time based on Lemma 1; (ii)
vertex mapping algorithm from pure strategy to H ′d.
Lemma 5. The min max problem of D-NASG and compact
optimization (19) reduces to each other in poly(n) time.
Lemma 4 and Lemma 5 together yield our desired result.
What is the Defender Oracle Problem
Through a series of reduction, we find that the NASG is
essentially a defender oracle problem defined on a low-
dimensional polytopeH ′d, but the complicated form of poly-
tope H ′d still prevents us from uncovering the mystery of the
NASG. Fortunately, based on the investigation of the geo-
metric structure of the H ′d, we will prove that the DOP is
indeed a problem of maximizing a pseudo-boolean function.
Theorem 7. The defender oracle problem is, for any vec-
tor w ∈ R|S|, maximize a pseudo-boolean function under a
cardinality constraint,
max
n∑
i=1
xi≥n−k,x∈{0,1}n
∑
V ∈S
wσ(V )
 ∏
{i}∈V
xi
 . (21)
The complexity of (21) is dependent on the support set
S. For example, in the simplest case, S = [n], we can ef-
ficiently solve such a problem by summing all the positive
elements of vector w, which corresponds to the traditional
additive security game. Instead, if S = {U ∈ 2[n]||U | ≤ 2},
then the oracle problem is a binary quadratic programming
problem, which is known to be NP-hard. If k = n, the above
problem will degenerate to the unconstrained optimization.
This result builds a connection between the NASG and op-
timizating a pseudo-boolean function, which enables us to
design an efficient DOP solver or understand the complexity
of NASG via analyzing the structure of the support set S and
using the results of combinatorial algorithm design.
Application to the Network Security Domain
In this section, we will apply our theoretical framework to
an important domain, in which the security game occurs
in a network. The following definition is motivated by the
works (Gueye, Marbukh, and Walrand 2012; Shakarian, Lei,
and Lindelauf 2014).
Definition 5. A network security game is given by the tuple
(G,T,Fa, c), where G = (V,E) with node set V , edge set
E, T is the network value function, Fa is the failure opera-
tor, c is the maximum number of nodes attacker can choose
and defender can protect any targets (k = n).
The network value function T : G→ R is a security mea-
sure assessing the utility of a network, and failure operator
Fa : 2
G → 2G is to generate a new network via a spe-
cific failure mode after removing some nodes. For example,
Algorithm 2 Separable Approximation
Calculate benefit B(U) = T (G) − T (Fa(G\U)),∀U ∈
A;
for each U ∈ A do
Calculate Bc(U) =
∑
W⊆U (−1)|U\W |B(W );
if |Bc(U)| ≤ c then B˜c(U) = 0;
end for
Create support set S and let (S1, . . . , Sm)← disjoint (S);
Shakarian et al. (2014) adopts the number of connected load
nodes as T , and edge cascading failure model as Fa. The
main result of our work is summarized as in TABLE 1.
Table 1: Solvability Status
CASES SOLVABILITY APPENDIX
Additive benefit function poly(n) Trivial
The separable support set S with poly(n) Theorem 6,
maxi |Ui| = Θ(log(n)) Corollary 1
Constant c, negative common utilities poly(n) Theorem 7,
except for singleton set Corollary 2
Constant c ≥ 2 NP-hard and efficient approximation Last Section
The first polynomial solvable class is trivial. The basic
idea of second solvable class is to show that when S is sep-
arable with size of largest component equal to Θ(log(n)),
the DOP is separable and can be solved in poly(n) time via
an enumerating algorithm. Here the “separable” is defined
as, S =
⋃m
i=1 Si such that Ai ∩ Aj = ∅,∀Ai ∈ Si, Aj ∈
Sj , i 6= j, the component is defined as Ui = ∪U∈SiU . In the
third solvable class, we will show that DOP under such con-
dition is indeed a submodular minimization problem, which
can be solved in poly(n) time. One may wonder why these
special cases are interesting. In fact, they correspond to the
following applications.
• The second class can be applied in a sparse network. For
example, if the size of largest connected component of
G is Θ(log(n)), S will satisfy the condition of second
solvable class (Corollary 1 in supplemental material).
• The third class can be applied to a dense network where
the most nodes are adjacent. For example, if c = 2, at-
tacking any two nodes will lead to the superposition of
the failure effect, resulting in negative common utilities.
• Another application of third class: in cybersecurity, the
sensor network often exhibits a tree topology. The game
is such that the attacker attempts to invade some nodes to
destroy the connectedness of the network and the IT man-
ager is required to deploy the anti-virus software in some
nodes. We can show that this game satisfies the condition
of the third class. (Corollary 2 in supplemental material)
For the general network (not sparse, not dense or not a
tree), the problem is clearly NP-hard and there exists two
problems: (1) can we still compactly represent the game if c
is large, i.e., |S| = poly(n)? (2) can we efficiently solve such
a game? To tackle these problems, we propose a novel sep-
arable approximation framework (Algorithm 2), which can
guarantee the approximation error of the original problem,
instead of the DOP. One crucial observation is that
the common utility in the realistic network is well concen-
trated around zero.
Then we can let most of the common utility functions
equal to 0 based on a given threshold c. Considering
Lemma 1 and a result of Lipton et al. (2003), the ap-
proximation error of the game value can be guaranteed
by  = 2c+1c. As we will show via simulations in the
supplemental material, this process will greatly reduce the
size of the support set S and lead to a separable struc-
ture of S. The resulting complexity of solving NASG is
poly(n)O(2maxi |Ui|). For example, in most networks in-
cluding Erdo¨s-Renyi, scale-free network and a 39−nodes
Italian communication network, only 10% approximation
error can reduce the complexity term maxi |Ui| to the order
of Θ(log(n)). Therefore, using our theoretical framework,
we can approximately and compactly represent a realis-
tic network security game and solve it in poly(n) time
with high accuracy.
Conclusion
In this paper, we examined the security game under non-
additive utility functions and a structured strategy space
(uniform matroid). We showed that the size of compact
representation is dependent on the number of non-additive
strategies, and NASG is essentially the problem of maximiz-
ing a pseudo-boolean function. Here the non-additive strate-
gies refer to those have non-zero common utilities. Com-
pared with previous results, this work greatly extends the
polynomial solvable class, provides an understanding of the
complexity properties, and partly answers the question pro-
posed by Xu (2016) in zero-sum, uniform matroid scenario.
For future directions, we plan to investigate (i) the rela-
tionship between the Oracle problem and the NASG when
the defender has a non-structured strategy space; (ii) how
to efficiently compute the defender’s mixed strategy when
attacker and defender have different benefit functions.
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